Security
Security audits and open findings
Which reviews have taken place, what they found, what has been fixed and what is still open.
Independent reviews
Smart contract auditNot yet
No independent firm has reviewed our contracts yet.
Application penetration testNot yet
Not carried out yet.
Internal code reviewAvailable
October 2026, and the private wallet and portal in November 2026. Results below.
When an independent report is published, it will be linked here in full, including any findings we disagree with.
Internal review, October 2026
The review read the code that handles identity, sessions, messages and private balances, rather than relying on documentation. Findings are described here by their effect on you. Technical detail lives in the repository.
Fixed
| Finding | Effect before the fix |
|---|---|
| Identity taken from request headers | Some routes trusted an address sent by the browser. Every route now reads identity only from the verified session. |
| Shielded balance readable by address | Anyone could query the private balance of any address. The endpoint now answers only for the signed in account. |
| Public route matching too broad | A route whose name began like a public one was treated as public. Matching now respects path boundaries. |
| Cross site requests | State changing requests from other websites were not reliably refused. They now are. |
| Sign in nonce | The nonce could be chosen by the browser. It is now issued and checked by the server. |
| PIN check failing for everyone | A bug made every PIN check fail after the PIN was set. Verification now works as intended. |
| Session token algorithm | One path accepted tokens without fixing the signing algorithm. It is now fixed to HMAC-SHA256. |
Internal review, November 2026
A review of the passkey unlock, the private wallet's Ethereum portal code and their configuration, made before any of it holds funds.
Fixed before release
| Finding | Effect before the fix |
|---|---|
| Passkey unlock trusted the unwrapped key | A corrupted or planted passkey record could have opened an account other than yours. The key a passkey unlocks must now be your own wallet's signature before anything is derived from it. |
| Backup could replace a record on your device | A bad copy from the server would have overwritten the good record on your device and stopped the passkey from working there. Records on your device now always win. |
| Passkeys tied to the exact host | A passkey enrolled on www.ledgerchat.org did not work on ledgerchat.org. Passkeys are now tied to ledgerchat.org on every subdomain. |
| Exits blocked during a pause | Pausing new payments would also have blocked claiming a deposit or withdrawing to Ethereum. Those exits now always work. |
| Portal token not checked against the portal | A token wired to another Ethereum contract would have burned a withdrawal. The wallet now reads the token's portal on your device and refuses a mismatch. |
| Look alike tokens in the configuration | A release could have listed a fake USDC. On Ethereum, every token must now be the official contract with its real decimals, or the portal stays off. |
| A withdrawal the wallet could not finish | Starting a withdrawal needs a second step on Ethereum that the wallet does not send yet. The withdraw form stays off until it does. |
Open
| Finding | Effect today | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Readable fallback messages | Messages that fail XMTP delivery are stored readable on our server. | Labelled in the chat. Server side rejection is ready and waits for client side sealing. |
| Community content | Posts and channel messages are stored readable on our server. | Documented. Encryption not started. |
| Attachments | Files are stored as uploaded and can be opened by anyone with the link. | Documented. Encryption not started. |
| Session cookies | Two cookie names carry the same session while older code is migrated. | In progress. |
| Dependencies | Some third party packages have published advisories. | Being upgraded in order of severity. |
| Public fee payer | Each private transaction names the account that pays its fee. | Private fee payment is the next piece of work. |
| Passkeys on real devices | Passkey unlock is tested against a simulated authenticator only. | To be tested on iPhone, Android, Windows and a security key. |
| Contracts not audited | Escrow, streams, the identity contract and the Ethereum portal have no external audit. | Escrow, streams and the portal stay off Aztec Alpha and Ethereum until they do. |
Found something that is not on this list? Please tell us privately first. See Report a vulnerability.
